Valparaiso University

ValpoScholar
Law Faculty Publications

Law Faculty Presentations and Publications

2012

The Decline of Oral Argument in the Federal
Courts of Appeals: A Modest Proposal for Reform
David R. Cleveland
Valparaiso University, david.cleveland@valpo.edu

Steven Wisotsky
Nova Southeastern University

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/law_fac_pubs
Part of the Courts Commons, Legal History, Theory and Process Commons, and the Litigation
Commons

Recommended Citation
David R. Cleveland & Steven Wisotsky, The Decline of Oral Argument in the Federal Courts of Appeals: A Modest Proposal for Reform, 13
J. App. Prac. & Process 119 (2012).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Presentations and Publications at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff
member at scholar@valpo.edu.

T E
UR AL F
APPELLATE PRACTICE
DPROCESS
ARTICLE
THE DECLINE OF ORAL ARGUMENT
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS:
A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
David R. Cleveland* and Steven Wisotsky**
I. INTRODUCTION

Federal appellate practice is not what is used to be. In the
1970s, oral argument was routinely granted and it was
generously sized at thirty min.utes per side. After a period of
1
dramatic shrinkage in both frequency and length in the 1980s
and 1990s, the role of oral argument has been greatly
diminished. It is now the exception rather than the rule. In 2011,
2
only one quarter of all federal appeals were orally ·argued, down
*Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University Law School.
**Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University.
1. As long ago as 1983, Justice Rehnquist described the "continuing demise" of oral
argument. William H. Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy: A Disappearing Art, 35 Mercer L. Rev.
1015, 1016 (1983-84)., See Part V, infra, for examination of oral argument's seeming slide
toward demise in the federal courts of appeals.
2. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 2011 Annual Report of the Director:
Judicial Business of the United States Courts 36 (20 12) (tbl. S-1: "U.S. Courts of
App,eals Appeals Terminated on the Merits after Oral Hearings or Submission on Briefs
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2011") [hereinafter "201 1 AO
Reporf']. The reader should note that these statistics do not include totals for the Federal
Circuit. /d.
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from nearly two-thirds in the early 1980s, and the time allotted
in most circuits was limited to fifteen minutes or less.
.

.

.

.

.

The drastic reduction in the frequency of oral argument and
its length has been driven largely by considerations of efficiency
as reflected in the universal adoption of case-screening methods
that shunt aside the majority of cases to a summary or non4
arglJment calendar. This separate decisional track involves "a
5
significantly lesser degree of personal attention by judges" by
placing "primary reliance for the operation of the screening
process on a centralltorganized, parajudicially-supervised
group of staff attorneys."
· The federal rule on this issue acknowledges the importance
of oral argument, but in practice permits it to be both brief and
7
8
rare. Procedural efficiency comes with a cost, of course, and
the extraordinary reduction in oral argument has diminished its
9
role. The decline of oral argument has been one casualty of the
procedural reforms made in respons_e to the crisis of cas_eload

3. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1980 Annual Report of the Director:
Judicial Business of the United States Courts (tbl. S-1: "U.S. Courts of Appeals Appeals
Tenninated on the Merits_after Oral Hearing or Submission on Briefs During the 12-Month
Period Ending September 30, 1980") [hereinafter "1980 A 0 Report"].
4. Thomas E. Baker, Rationing Justice on Appeal, 108-17 (West 1994).
5. John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth Circuit's Experience in the
Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties, 1991 BYU L.Rev. 859,860.
6. /d. Screening programs vary somewhat from circuit to circuit, but the majority are
based on the prototype pioneered by the Fifth Circuit in the 1970s. /d. at 865-66.
7. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) (Westlaw 2012) (providing that ''oral argument must be
allowed in every case unless a panel of three judges who have examined the briefs and
record unanimously agrees that oral argument is 1.IDfle_cessary").
8. Mark R: Kravitz, Words to the Wise, 5 J. App. Prac. & Process 543, 544 (2003)
(asserting that appellate courts, federal and state, have "increasingly sacrificed oral
argument on the altar of 'efficiency'"); Lauren K. Robel, Case/oad and Judging: Judicial
Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU L. Rev. 3, 4 (discussing appellate courts' "survival
responses" to burgeoning dockets); Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early
Warning, 129 u·. Pa. L. Rev. 777, 777-78 (1981) (stating that refonns implemented to
increase efficiency in the federal judiciary have led to "significant costs to the quality of
justice''); Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the
Federal Courts, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 11, 13 (1996) (opining that "[m]easures adopted to cope
with rising caseloads have exacerbated the 'crisis' by sharply altering time-honored
traditions of appellate justice"); Baker, supra n. 4, at 114 (arguing that "the design of the
system has been compromised, severely and profoundly, and possibly irredeemably, by
such proportionally high rates of denial of oral argument").
9. Baker, supra n. 4, at 113 (pointing out that "the [oral argument] denial rate seems to
have outgrown the announced justification for denial") .
•
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10

volumes that began in the 1980s. Reduction in oral argument
has been described as a response to pressure, taken almost
11
against the courts' own will.
The result is a more efficient but more paper-driven
bureaucratic process of appellate decisionmaking. There is less
input from the lawyers. The values implicit in appellate review
12
are weakened or diluted. Moreover, there is a disturbing
appearance of correlation between the decline in frequency of
oral argument and the decline in reversal rates in both civil and
criminal cases. For example, Judge John Godbold cited data in
1994 showing a decline of one half in the overall federal
appellate reversal rate from 1982 to 1993, from 19.9 percent to
10.3 percent, with a significant decline in every category of
13
appeal. By 2 0 11 , the reversal rate had fallen further, to 8. 9
14
percent overall and 5.8 percent in criminal cases.
Could the decline in reversal rates and the decline in
frequency of oral argument be coincidental? They could. Or one
might say that better screening procedures have increased the
accuracy of appellate decision making to a more "correct"
reversal rate than the historic figures. But one might also
reasonably suspect that the very same process that shunts the
vast majority of cases to the summary calendar is responsible for
an institutional readiness to dispose of the cases by affirming the
decisions below. Thus, the authors fear, though they are not the
first to do so, that "[w]e have lowered our expectations for
appellate procedure. We have defmed down our appellate
10. Robert J. Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge to the
Conventional Wisdonz, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 3 (1986).
II. /d. at 3-4 ("To most observers of and participants in the appellate process, these
restrictions on oral argument are highly regrettable, forced upon the courts by an
overwhelming caseload, and adopted only with great reluctance.").
12. Oakley, supra n. 5, at 865 (contrasting cases screened off the regular argument
calendar with those that remain on it). Professor Oakley identifies four such values under
the following rubrics: error correction; institutional impact; a sense of participation; and
legitimation of judicial decisions. /d. at 869-7l.These and other values are discussed below
in Part IV.
13. Steven Wisotslcy, Professional Judgment on Appeal: Bringing and Opposing
Appeals 12 (2d ed. Carolina Academic Press 2009) (citing John C. Godbold, Twenty Pages
and Twenty Minutes Revisited 2 (Rec. J. of the Fla. B. Sec. of App. Prac. & Advoc. Mar.
1994)).
14. 2011 AO Report, supra n. 2, at 89 (tbl. B-5: "U.S. Courts of Appeals Appeals
Terminated on the Merits, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30,
2011 ").

•
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values. We all have internalized the postmodern norms of the
15
minimalist procedural paradigm."
Oral argument is too central to the appellate process and
too valuable to sacrifice on the altar of efficiency. We propose a
16
return to a greater role for oral advocacy. Part I of this article
briefly outlines the importance of oral presentation in Western
culture, modem communication, and traditional common law
argument. Part II collects the federal rule of appellate procedure
and corresponding local rules and internal operating procedures
that govern the grant, or more often the denial, of oral argument.
Part III examines the numerous and varied values of appellate
justice that are served by oral argument. Part IV demonstrates
the dramatic decline of oral argument since 1970. Finally, the
authors propose modest refonns for restoring a greater role for
oral argument in the federal courts of appeals.
II. HISTORICAL VALUE OF ORAL DISCOURSE AND ARGUMENT
The power of oral argument was known to the ancient
philosophers. "One of the persistent themes of Western thought
since Plato is that speech is a superior form of communication to
17
writing." The Greeks "regarded writing simply as a method of
18
chronicling. Their test was always the spoken word.'' Plato, for
example_, recounts a dialogue between Socrates and Phaedrus
expressing the necessity and humanity of oral dialogue and its

15. Thomas E. Baker, Applied Freakonomics: Explaining the HCrisis of Volume" 8 J.
App. Prac. & Process I 01, 114 (2006).
16. Calls to preserve, restore, or merely value oral argument are certainly not new, but
now that the language and rhetoric of the "crisis of volume" have died down, perhaps there
is an opportunity to rethink these issues in a new light See Baker, supra n. 4; Paul D.
Carrington, et al., Justice on Appeal (West 1976); Daniel J. Meador, Toward Orality and
Visibility in the Appellate Process, 42 Md. L. Rev.. 732 (1983); Mark R. Kravitz, Written
and Oral Persuasion in the United States Courts: A District Judge's Perspective on Their
History, Functioh, and Future, 10 J. App. Prac. & Process 24 7 (2009); Martineau, supra n.
10, at 1; see also Baker, supra n. 15, at 102 (noting that discussion about a court in crisis
seems to have vanished, giving way to a perception of "business as usual" in the federal
courts of appeals).
17. Suzanne Ehrenberg, Embracing the Writing Centered Legal Process, 89 Iowa L.
Rev. 1159, 1161 (2004).
18. Kravitz, supra n. 16, at 248 (quoting Oscar Wilde, The Critic as Artist, in Plays,
Prose Writings and Poems 1, 12 (Alfred A. Knopf 1991)).
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superiority to writing. As Socrates explains, true knowledge
and understanding is hampered by fixing one's thoughts into a
writing, which fosters misunderstanding and cannot be
questioned further because a writing "produce[s] the same
2
unvarying meaning, over and over again. " ° Communication
must be tailored to the speaker and the listener, he argues, and
21
sown not in ink but in the soul.
Socrates urged Phaedrus to tell the speechwriters, including
the law-makers,
that if their compositions are based on knowledge of the
truth, and they can defend or prove them, when they are put
to the test, by spoken arguments, which leave their writings
poor in comparison of them, then they are to be called, not
only poets, orators, legislators, but are worthi of a higher
2
name, befitting the serious pursuit of their life.

These notions of the humanity, gravity, and interactivity of oral
discourse are important in pursuing appellate justice.
An early communications scholar of the modern era,
Harold Innis, argued that a balance of oral and written
communications promoted the intellectual greatness of ancient
23
Greece. Plato's preservation, in writing, of the dialogues of
Socrates, which were oral, captured the strengths of both forms
of communication. Professor Innis favored this "use of
dialogues, allegories and illustrations" to capt1..1re the benefits of
24
spoken language and interaction and fix it for future readers.
Modem American legal practice, particularly at the
appellate level, has tilted heavily toward written communication

19. Plato, Phaedrus, in Selected Dialogues of Plato (Benjamin Jowett trans., Modem
Library 2000); see also Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the
Word (2d ed., Routledge 2002); Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making
of Typographic Man (U. Toronto Press 1962).
20. Plato, supra n. 19, at 191.
21. /d.; see also id. at 194-95 ("only in principles of justice and goodness and nobility
taught and communicated orally for the sake of instruction and inscribed on the soul ... is
there clearness and perfection and seriousness").
22. Id. at 195.
23. Harold Innis, Empire and Communications 53-84 (U. Toronto Press 1972) (chapter
4: "The Oral Tradition and Greek Civilization").
24. ld. at 57. Likewise, this perceived balance of written submissions and oral
argument was also praised by Professor Martineau in his comparative examination of the
English and American appellate systems. See generally Robert J. Martineau, Appellate
Justice in England and the United States: A Comparative Analysis (W.S. Hein 1990).
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and away from oral communication. Advocates present in
writing rather than engaging and connecting· in person. Chief
Justice Rehnquist once recounted a tale of a New York appellate
judge who chastised an attorney for reading from his brief in
25
violation of a court rule prohibiting argument in that form. The
judge explained the court rule and reasoned that the court had
26
read the brief. Counsel in his own defense proclaimed, "Yes,
27
but you have not heard it with gestures." The point of the story
is that there is an important dimension to communication
beyond word choice. The power and value of an oral
presentation is its potential to engage the decisionmakers. As
Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, "the more flesh and blood you
can insert into it, as opposed to a dry recitation of principles of
law or decided cases, the more interesting and effective that
28
argument can be." What the Chief Justice's comments speak to
is the visceral, engaging, and human nature of oral discourse,
attributes that are stripped from our justice system in what is, for
the vast majority of cases, a desiccated text-only process.
Appeals in the English courts have been largely conducted
through oral presentation and argument since the e-arly days of
29
the common law. The same is true in most other common law
30
countries. Professor Ehrenberg has extensively examined the
divergence between the English and American systems on the
issue of oral argument. As she summarizes, "[o]ral advocacy is
31
the heart of the English legal system." Another extensive study
of the English and American appellate processes concluded that
''[t]he heart of the English legal system and u:Eon which all
major aspects of it are based is the oral tradition.''
Traditionally, English barristers did not file lengthy written
submissions to· the court but orally educated the court on the
25. Relmquist, supra n. 1, at 1024.
26. /d.
27. /d.
28. !d.
29. Ehrenberg, supra n. 17, at 1162.
30. ld. at 1162, 1166 n. 20. Interestingly, the other common law nation to .emphasize
written over oral advocacy is Canada, though even it does not require extensive written
briefing in the American style before the intennediate appellate court. /d. at 1166, 1166 n.
19.
31. Id. at 1166.
32. Martineau, supra n. 24, at 101.
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facts, law, and argument over the course of hours. In many
cases, even the judges' deliberations would be made in open
34
court.
Though comparatively time-consuming for judges
(though not necessarily for lawyers, who under the system in the
United States would devote far more time to the writing of
appellate briefs), the system has several benefits. First, it brings
the entire process of argument and decisionmaking into public
view. It puts the decisionmakers, advocates, and individuals
whose lives are affected together in the same room for an
extended period of time, emphasizing the gravity and humanity
of the task. Second, it makes the entire enterprise interactive,
allowing the judges and lawyers to engage in a manner that
addresses one another's concerns and to probe the areas of
ambiguity in the case. The lawyer gains greater assurance that
his points are understood, even if they are ultimately rejected,
and the court is better able to interrogate the counsel regarding
issues that might be obscured in the written briefing. Oral
argument enhances understanding. To dispense with it is a loss
like teaching a law school class by reading judicial opinions
aloud without discussion or question and answer.
Appellate practice in England was an overwhelmingly oral
one from the early common law until the mid-twentieth
35
century. Few written records were produced at trial, typically
just the court's record of the pleading and the court's sum.Inary
of its judgment, and submission of the case on appeal was an
36
oral not written process. Litigants aggrieved by a trial court
judgment would argue their case, informing the court of the
defects in the trial court's judgment and receiving an oral
37
judgment from the court. Every aspect of the case, even the
written record from the trial court, was presented orally by the
advocates rather than reviewed in chambers by judges before the
38
hearing. Oral argument was less in the manner of modem
American argumentation and more of "a continuing discussion
of the relevant facts and cases, with both counsel and the judges
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Ehrenberg, supra n. 17, at 1167.
/d.
Id. at 1174.
/d. at 1174-75.

ld.
ld. at 1176.
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contributing when appropriate." This process existed in both
the earliest appeals, heard by a panel of trial judges, and in the
later era where appeals were heard by an independent appellate

judiciary.

40

. Modem English apgeals are conducted in a similar, alm~st
enttrely oral manner.
The appellate courts have qutte
consciously considered and rejected the writing-centered
42
approach of United States appeals. English courts rejected
sugg_estions that they increase the use- of written submissions,
and review by judges without the participation of lawyers was
43
rejected throughout the mid-twentieth century. A committee in
the 1950s, an experiment in the 1960s, and study in the 1970s all
arrived at the same conclusion: The traditional oral appellate
44
process was preferable. In the 1980s, English appe-als first
permitted; then required, a brief written statement from the
45
parties of the issues on appeal. That statement was intended
46
only to identify the issues, not argue the case. The strengths of
this oral-centered process are the assurances that the process of
educating the bench was open and interactive and that the
process of open deliberation was more publicly accountable and
47
resulted in fewer dissents. B,y contrast, the written process has
been viewed as more time-consuming and costly overall, and
48
especially for litigants.
Appellate cases in the United States in the founding era
were conducted in a similar manner, with oral arguments
playing_ a dominant role and taking whatever time was
49
necessary, even when that was several days. The first domestic
push to create a body of professional lawyers required putative
lawyers to learn by reading the law, especially the reports of
Coke and Blackstone, typically at the office of an existing
'

39. Martineau, supra n. 10, at 7.
40. Ehrenberg, supra n. 17, at 1175.
41. !d. at 1176.
42. !d.

43. !d.
44. /d. at 1176, 1176 n. 88.
45. !d. at 1177.
46. ld. at 1177; see also Martineau, supra n. 24, at 129-30.
4 7. Ehrenberg, supra n. 17, at 1176.
48. Id.
49. /d. at 1179.
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50

lawyer. Training by an English Inn of Court or in the
traditional, oral-centered English manner was rare. Much of the
colonial era litigation was ''' conducted by attorneys who lacked
the classic education and legal training of the English barrister,
and who had ~~ political motive to preserve a system based on
5
oral advocacy.
Combined with this new type of lawyer was the new type
of nation, a very large and expanding one. The written word
became an important tool for all branches of government,
including the law, to conduct their business over this large
52
land~ The importance of writing in early America was also
driven by this new nation's considerable distrust between
legislatures and courts, leading to statutory requirements of
written opinions as well as increasing courts' desire to explain
3
their rulings. 5 Moreover, the new American legal system had a
need and desire to create its own body of law and precedent, a
4
goal facilitated by greater reliance on writing.5
This ascendancy of writing-centered appellate practice can
be seen in the United States Supreme Court practice, which by
1795 began to require a statement of the key points at issue,
similar to that adopted by the English courts only in the late
55
1980s. By 1833, parties could submit a brief in lieu of
argument and in 1849 the Court set a two-hour per attorney limit
56
on ora1 argument.
By the end of the nineteenth century, that time was further
57
limited to two hours per side. But "[t]he emphasis on oratory

50. David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone, 10 J. App. Prac. & Process 61,
78-79 (20 10); cf Kravitz, supra n. 16, at 249 (noting that American law borrowed from
Blackstone and Coke in the early years of the republic).
51.- Ehrenberg, supra n. 17, at 1180.
52. !d.
53. Kravitz, supra n. 16, at 255-56; see also Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the
American Revolution 323-25 (Alfred A. Knopf 1992) (outlining the- rise of an independent
judiciary and noting_that "[t]he desire for an independent expert judiciary was bred by the
continuing ... fears of democratic politics") (footnote omitted).
54. Kravitz, supra n. 16; at 256; Cleveland, supra n. 50, at 80-81.
55. Ehrenberg, supra n. 17, at 1181.
56. ld.
57. Kravitz, supra n. 16, at 252-53; see also A Good Quarrel: America,s Top Legal
Reporters Share Stories from Inside the Supreme Court 6 (Timothy R. Johnson and Jerry
Goldman eds., U. Mich. Press 2009) [hereinafter A Good Quarrel]. Chief Justic_e Burg~r

128
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in the Supreme Court nonetheless continued well into the
nineteenth century," as evidenced by the six-day argument in
Gibbons v. Ogden in 1821 and the eight-day argument in the
58
Amistad case in 1841.
The shift from oral hearing to written submission followed
a similar pattern in the state courts throughout the nineteenth
59
century. By the early twentieth century, the American practice
of oral argument supplementing extensive written briefs had
supplanted the English practice of extensive oral hearing
60
supplemented by minimal written documents. While lengthy
oral hearing providing a full examination, deliberation, and
decision of a case has been replaced by a more succinct and
constricted oral arg•Jtnent, oral argument remains a fundamental
61
part of the American appellate tradition.
Oral argument of appeals was a traditional feature of the
federal appellate process until relatively recently, accounting for
nearly two-thirds of the case dispositions in 1971, 1981, and
1982. As to length of oral argument, in mid-twentieth century
most American courts reportedly permitted an hour of oral
argument per side, though that time was reduced in many federal
62
courts of appeals by the mid-1970s. Now oral argument is
63
granted in a very small percentage of cases. This decline in the
grants of, and time for, oral argument was protested by the
64
American Bar Association. Contemporary scholars expressed
similar concerns. Professors Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg
expressed their regret at the trend of diminished oral argument,
and they proposed the following as a rule that adequately valued
later reduced oral argument before the Court to thirty minutes per side. A Good Qua"e/,
supra this note, at 6.
58. Kravitz, supra n. 16, at 251; see also R. Kirkland Cozine, The Entergence of
Written Appellate Briefs in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 38 Am. J. Leg. History
482, 488 (1994) (pointing out that in "the first half of the nineteenth century ... , oral
argument was available to counsel in unlimited amount").
59. Ehrenberg, supra n. 17, at 1182.

60. !d. at 1183.
61. Carrington, supra n. 16, at 16-17; Baker, supra n. 4, at I 09 (asserting that "denying
oral argument runs counter to American appellate tradition").
62. Carrington, supra n. 16, at 16-17 ("Not many decades ago, the noun in many
American appellate courts was to allow an hour to each side.").
63. See Part V, infra.
64. Carrington, supra n. 16, at 18 n. 4 (pointing out that the ABA's House of Delegates
opposed rules eliminating or curtailing oral argument).
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and protected oral argument:
Oral argument will be heard in every appeal that is to be
decided on its merits if any party or any member of the
court requests it. In any case in which oral argument has
been requested by a party, the court may in the prescribed
manner invite, but may not require, all parties to waive it.
The length of the argument will be determined by the court
with due regard for the ooportunity of eac-h party to make
. 6~
.
an adequate presentatton.

•

In 1983, Professor Meador made a much broader call for
66
greater orality in appeals. His proposal was to reduce the
written filings to identifying the issues and allow for oral
argument and conference in the unlimited English tradition, at
67
least for some cases. Such a practice would be a better balance
of written and oral communication, reduce the duplication
caused by both extensive written briefing and lengthy oral
arguments, and preserve the value of the appellate advocate in
68
the process. This proposal found support from the ABA and
others, but its particulars were deemed impractical in the highvolume, geographically dispersed, and efficiency-minded
69
modern American appellate system.
In an attempt to set a national minimum, the Hruska
Conunission had reported even earlier that
[b ]ecause conditions vary substantially from circuit to
circuit, each court of appeals should have the authority to
establish its own standards, so long as the -n ational
minimum is satisfied, and to provide ·p rocedures for
implementation which are particularly suited to local
70
needs,

65. ld. at 18.
66. Meador, supra n. 16, at 749 (suggesting an oral-argument procedure based on the
English model that would be '\an amalgam of counsel's presentation of argument and
authority, the judges' probing of counsel; and the judges' conferring among themselves").
67. Id.
68. Baker, supra n. 4, at 165-66 (quoting American Bar Association, Action
Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay, Attacking Litigation Costs and Delay 2627 (ABA 1984)).
69. !d. (citing several state experiments with such a practice and a 1984 ABA
commission report calling for ''curtailing briefs, while preserving oral argument").
70. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and
Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change., 67 F.R.D. 195, 201 (1975)
[hereinafter Hroska Commission Report].
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and proposed what is now embodied in Rule 34(a). The
proposed national minimum was intended as a check on some
local rules that permitted denial of oral argument whenever the
court felt the case was of such a character that it did not justify
72
oral argument. In reality, it was an equally vague and
73
subjective standard, now promulgated on a nationwide scale,
and it led to the present state of oral argument in the federal
courts, making it a rare and fleeting occurrence.
III. CURRENT ORAL ARGUMENT RULES OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS

Rule 34 governs the pant or denial of oral argument in the
7
federal courts of appeals.
The standard for oral argument set by Rule 34(2) is to
allow for oral argument "in every case unless a panel of three
judges who have examined the briefs and record unanimously
agrees that oral argument is unnecessary," and sets out the
following reasons to guide the panel in making that decision:
A. the appeal is frivolous;
B. the dispositive issue or issues have been
authoritatively decided; or

C. the facts and legal arguments are adequately
presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional
process would not be significantly aided by oral
75
argument.

This text certainly seems to favor oral argument, as indeed it
71. !d.
72.. Baker, supra n. 4, at 108-09 (quoting Charles R. Haworth; Circuit Splitting and the
HNew·' National Court ofAppeals: Can the Mouse Roar? 30 Sw. L.J. 839, 866 (1976)).
73. See Fed R. App. P. 34; see also Part III, infra (discussing circularity and inefficacy
of rule).
74. Fed R. App. P. 34. That rule is supplemented by local rules and internal operating
procedures in the circuits to govern local practices. See D.C. Cir. R. 34 & D.C. Cir. I.O.P.
XI; 1st Cir. R. 34.0 & 1st Cir. I.O.P. VIII; 2d Cir. R. 34.1-34.2; 3d Cir. R. 34.1-34.3 & 3d
Cir. J.O.P. 2.1-2.5; 4th Cir. R. 34(a)-(e) & 4th Cir. I.O.P. 34.1-34.3; 5th Cir. R. 34.134.13 & 5th Cir. I.O.P. 34; 6th Cir. R. 34(a)-(g) & 6th Cir. l.O.P. 34 (a)-{d); 7th Cir. R.
34(a)-(h) & 7th Cir. O.P. l(c)(7) (characterizing any order issued pursuant to Fed. R. App.
P. 34 as "nonroutine"); 8th Cir. R. 34A, 34B & 8th Cir. I.O.P. I(D)( 1)-(2) (describing
argument and hearing panels), III(K); 9th Cir. R. 34(1)-(3) & advisory comm. n. 2; I Oth
Cir. R. 34.1; 11th Cir. R. 34(1)--(4) & lith Cir. l.O.P. 1-16 (pertaining to lith Cir. R. 34).
75. Fed R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(A)-{C).
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was so intended. But the exceptions listed in parts A, B, and C
are so broad that they effectively swallow the rule. The
traditional default position in favor of oral argument for appeals
has given way, even under the rule of this "minimum standard,"
77
to a default of no argument.
Part A seems a suitably narrow and reasonable exception.
No oral argument is needed in a case that is frivolous on its face.
"Frivolous" as a legal standard is an exceptionally low bar and is
78
traditionally examined at the outset of a proceeding. Part B,
"when the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively
79
decided,'' is merely a type of frivolous appeal. Finally, Part C
is the catch-all provision, which institutionalizes the very local
rule formulations that Rule 34 was supposed to counter. Rule
34(a)(l)(C) grants the court the authority to deny oral argument
whenever its members think oral argument is unnecessary (that
is, when the "decisional process would not be significantly aided
80
by oral argument.") This provision begs the question. The
conclusion reached, that oral argument is unnecessary, is
justified by the conclusion that oral argument is unnecessary. As

federal court exJert Thomas E. Baker explains: "This is not a
standard at all."
The local rules and internal operating procedures in almost
every circuit do not alter or supplement the test for granting or
denying oral argument set out in the Federal Rules of Appellate
82
Procedure. Several are entirely silent on the standard or merely
76. Hruska Commission Report, 67 F.R.D. at 200-01.
77. See Part V, infra (detailing the decline and present rarity of oral argument).
78. Steven Wisotsky, Professional Judgment on Appeal: Bringing and Opposing
Appeals 242 (2d. ed. Carolina Academic P. 2009).
79. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(B).
80. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(l)(C).
81. Baker, supra n. 4, at 109.
82. Fed. Cir. I.O.P. 7(2) (restating the text of Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)); 1st Cir. R. 34.0
& 1st Cir. I.O.P. VIII (relying on standard of grant/denial of oral argument in Fed. R. App.
P. 34(a)(2)); 3d Cir. R. 34. l(a) (restating the requirement of unanimity stated in Fed. R.
App. P. 34(a)(2)); 4th Cir. R. 34(a)(2) (providing that the standard to be applied will be the
same as found in Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)); 5th Cir. R. 34 (referring briefly to Fed. R. App.
P. 34(a)(2) as the governing standard); 6th Cir. R. 34 (relying sub silentio on Fed. R. App.
P. 34(a)(2) standard for grant or denial of oral argument); 7th Cir. R. 34(4) (mentioning
only briefly that the standards of Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) are controlling); 8th Cir. R. 34A &
8th Cir. I.O.P. I(D) (relying sub silentio on standard of grant/denial of oral argument in
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2), and referring to the federal rule in a cross-reference); lOth Cir. R.
34.l(G) (allowing "[s]ubmission on briefs," and providing that ''[e]xcept in prose appeals
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restate or refer to Rule 34. By contrast, the Third Circuit offers
additional guidelines to suggest when oral argument is more
84
likely to be granted. It also offers language suggesting that oral
argument is the default. The internal operating procedures of the
Third Circuit explain:
lOP 2.4.1 Experience discloses that judges usually find oral
argument unnecessary when:
(a) The issue is tightly constrained, not novel, and the
briefs adequately cover the arguments;
(b) The outcome of the appeal is clearly controlled by
a decision of the Supreme Court or this court; or
(c) The state of the record will determine the outcome
and the sole issue is either sufficiency of the evidence,
the adequacy of jury instructions, or rulings as to
admissibility of evidence, and the briefs adequately
refer to the record.
lOP 2.4.2 Experience discloses that judges usually vote for
oral argument when:
(a) The appeal presents a substantial and novel legal
•

ISSUe;

(b) The resolution of an issue presented by the appeal
will be of institutional or precedential value;
(c) A judge has questions to ask counsel to clarify an
important legal, factual, or procedural point;

•

(d) A decision, legislation, or an event subsequent to
the filing of the last brief may significantly bear on
the case; or
(e) An important public interest may be affected.

85

or when both parties have waived oral argument, the court will advise the parties when a
panel decides that oral argument is not necessary"); 11th Cir. R. 34-3(b) (expressly stating
that standard to be applied will be the minimum standard found in Fed. R. App. P.
34(a)(2)).
83. See generally n. 82, supra.
84. 3d Cir. I.O.P. 2.4 ("Suggested Criteria for Oral Argument'').

85. Id.
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These guidelines certainly provide a greater basis for
examining the suitability of a case for oral argument. They are
not binding on a panel, however, because the criteria set out in
them "shall not be construed to limit any judge's discretion in
86
voting for oral argument. " This particular set of guidelines as
well as the phrasing of lOP 2.4.3 certainly seems both to favor
oral argument and to provide a more rational basis for sorting
cases into argument and non-argument categories. The Fifth
Circuit does not alter the standard in any substantive way, but it
does suggest that the parties' preference for oral argument be
87
given "due, but not controlling, weight. " Even such a mild
suggestion about the importance of the parties' wishes or about
oral argument itself is largely absent from the local rules and
procedures of most circuits. Regardless of the intention of the
Hruska Commission report or the seeming value of oral
argument in the text of Rule 34(a)(2) itself, the written standard
has been unsuccessful at preserving oral argument or providing
~ meanin§ftul basis for judging when oral argument is
tmportant.
The problem extends beyond merely the written standard,
however. The rule as written requires a unanimous decision by
the "panel of three judges who have examined the briefs and
89
record" to deny oral argument. This type of review does not
occur in cases sent to a non-argument calendar based on the
category or type of appeal. For example, the Second Circuit
automatically denies argument in several types of immigration

86. 3d Cir. I.O.P. 2.4.3.
87. 5th Cir. R. 28.2.3.
88. See Part V, infra (describing the numerical and durational decline of oral argwnent
in the federal appellate courts). This decline stands in striking parallel to the federal
appellate courts' rules and practices on unpublished opinions. While the local rules often
set forth a basis for issuing opinions as published or unpublished, with a stated preference
for traditional publication, the actual practice has been a steadily declining rate of
publication such that only a small fraction of court dispositions are issued as fully
recognized published opinions. See David R. Cleveland, Local Rules in the Wake of
Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 32.1, 11 J. App. Prac. & Process l9, 27-42 (2011).
89. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

134

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
90

,appeals. It ,also leaves open the possibility that other classes-of
cases, in addition to individual cases, might be deemed not
worthy of oral ar~ment and, as a class, shunted to the non91
argument calendar. This seems incompatible with the Rule 34
requirement that all cases be given oral argument unless a threejudge panel, having reviewed the brief and record, rules
92
otherwise.
But categorical denial of oral argument is not the only
troubling practice. Even where each case is looked at
individually, the question of who is making the decision to grant
or deny oral argument, both practically and technically, is an
issue in some circuits. Most circuits have a three-judge panel
make the decision on whether to grant oral argument, consistent
93
with Rule 34. But some circuits, at least based upon their local
rules and procedures as written, seem to allow the staff to make
the initial screening decision, which is then implicitly or
explicitly reversible by the hearing panel. The Eighth Circuit's
local rules, for example, permit a clerk or senior staff attorney to
screen cases into argument and non-argument categories, though
94
the case can be reclassified by the hearing panel. The Ninth
Circuit also seems to pertnit the: clerk's office and staff attorneys
to determine whether a case is "eligible for submission without
oral argument under Rule 34(a),'' and to place that case on the
90. See 2d Cir. R. 34.2(a)(l):
(I) Immigration. An appeal or petition for review, and any related motion, in
which a party seeks review of the denial of:
(A) a claim for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA);
(B) a claim for withholding of removal under the INA;
(C) a claim for withholding or deferral of removal under the Convention
Against Torture; or
(D) a motion to reopen or reconsider an order involving one of the claims
listed above.

I d.
91. 2d Cir. R. 34.2(a)(2) (allowing use of the non-argument calendar as the default for
"[a]ny other class of cases that the court identifies as appropriate for the [Non-Argument
Calendar]'').
92. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).
93. For example, in the Eleventh Circuit, it seems clear that a panel of judges is doing
the screening. 11th Cir. R. 34-3(b) ("When a panel of judges of the court unanimously
detennines, after an examination of the briefs and records, that an appeal of a party falls
within one of the three categories of Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) ... that appeal will be-placed
on the non-argument calendar for submission and decision without oral argument.").
94. 8th Cir. R. 34A(a), (c).
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non-argument calendar. Overruling the staffs placement of the
appeal on the non-argument ("screening") calendar, can be done
by the judges after hearing the staffs presentation about the
96
case.
Though other circuits' rules describe the role of staff in
screening cases for argument, and doubtless some have
procedures not explicated in the local rules, they tend·to describe
the staffs role ·as more advisory and less determinative. For
example, a Sixth Circuit lOP once explained that '~[t]he staff
attorney section reviews this court's docket to identify cases
which offer the possibility of decision without oral argument,"
and that while the staff attorneys provide the he,aring panel with
a memorandum explainin,g the case and the possibility of
decision without argument, the panel of judges makes the
97
decision. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit IOP describes a
process by which a staff recommendation is sent first to a single
judge and then to two additional judges, and oral argument is
98
rejected only upon unanimity of all three judges. This seems
more appropriate and consistent with Rule 34 than a system that
99
allows non-judicial determination subje-ct to judicial reversa1.
Of course, there are some innovations in the local rules that
increase the opportunity for oral argument or add small
consolation procedures in recognition of the loss occasioned by
denial of argument. For example, the Sixth Circuit's local rule

95. 9th Cir. Gen. Ord. VI. 6.5(a), (b) (Nov. 1, 2011).
96. 9th Cir. R. 34; 9th Cir. Gen. Ord. VI. 6.5(b)(i) (''The staff attorneys shall orally
present the proposed dispositions to the scre,e ning panels . . . , the panel members discuss
the proposed disposition and make any necessary revisions," and "if the three panel
members unanimously agree," the staff attorney's proposed disposition is certified); 9th
Cir. Gen. Ord. VI. 65(b) (ii) ("All three judges must agree that the case is suitable for the
screening program before a case is disposed of by a screening panel. Any one judge may
reject a case from screening.").
97. 6th Cir. I.O.P. 34(e) (no longer in force; superseded in revisions of Aug. 16, 2012,
by I.O.P. that does not include this provision); see also D.C~ Cir. I.O.P. II(C)(2) (providing
that '"Rule 340)' cases" may be decided without oral argument); D.C. Cir. I.O.P. IX(C)(l)
(noting that cases can be marked by Staff attorney for potential decision without oral
argument and describing process by which a single judge ,m ay grant oral argument but only
the entire pane1 may deny it; and also noting that case may be moved from the list of
'''Regular Merits; case[sT~ to the list of cases to be. decided without oral argument).
98. 11th Cir. I.O.P. 34.1 (pertaining to 11th Cir. R. 34).
99. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) (providing that decision about necessity of oral
argument is to be made by three-judge panel).

•
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permits a teleconference argument to be ordered by the court.
Similarly, the Third Circuit's local rule expressly provides for
the possibility of a video-conference argument at the request of a
101
party.
Such rules allow for greater oral advocacy and
overcome the travel-time-and-cost argument often advanced as a
reason for denial of oral argument. While they do not preserve
all the benefits of live appellate oral argument, these
technologically enabled arguments are certainly an improvement
over a brief-only submission to the court. Alternatively, the
Federal Circuit provides no similar opportunity, but it does offer
a written substitute for oral argument: an additional opportunity
102
to file a reply brief.
In addition, some circuits require that
appeals denied oral argument be unanimous on the merits,
presumably as a safeguard against denJing argument on truly
10
close or sharply contested legal issues.
The modem rule structure, taking into account the national
rule and local rules and procedures, reveals a system in which
oral argument is deemed important and is the default position,
overcome only by a unanimous judgment of the court. But the
operational reality is that very few appeals are set for oral
argument. Even when granted, oral argument is much shorter
104
than in the past, a quarter of the time allotted a century ago.
There is a tension within the circuits between the appellate ideal
and the practical considerations in processing cases to
disposition. Oral argument remains the ideal, but p.erhaps an
105
ideal viewed as no longer attainable.
The diminished number of oral arguments has so devalued
the practice in the minds of some that it has led to a legislative
106
Others have expressed regret
call for even further reduction.

•

.

100. 6th Cir. R. 34(g)(3).
101. 3d Cir. R. 34.l(e) ("A party may request oral argument by video-conference.").
102. Fed. Cir. R. 34(a) (captioned "Reply Brief Instead of Oral Argument" and
petmitting appellant who neglected to file a reply brief in anticipation of oral argument to
file one if the case is not set for oral argument) .
103. 4th Cir. I.O.P. 34.2; 11th Cir. R. 34-3(b)(3).
104. See Part V, infra.
105. Baker, supra n. 4, at 116-17.
106. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight
and the Courts, Chairman's Report on the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the
United States Courts of Appeals 10 (Mar. 1999) ("Courts with pennissive standards for
granting oral argument, or which grant oral argument every time it is requested, should
seriously consider modifying their policies so that the deciding judges might exercise
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over this diminishment, and offered alternative rules or
107
procedures to preserve oral argument.
Perhaps now the
federal appellate courts can consider rebalancing their
procedures in a manner that restores the traditional practice of
108
oral argument.

IV. VALUE OF ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument benefits all stakeholders in the appellate
system from the public, to the litigants and their counsel, to the
judges and the court itself. Courts in crisis, or perceiving
themselves to be in crisis, have developed non-argument
procedures and reduced the rate of, and time for, oral
109
argument.
The values implicit in appellate review are
11 0
weakened or diluted.
The modem appellate courts have been described as a
decision factory: "briefs go in one end . . . and opinions come
out the other end, without any chance for the public or the
parties to understand who really decided the case and whether
111
the decisionmakers truly understood the parties' concerns." It
has been suggested that courts have "severely," "profoundly,"
and "possibly irredeemably" compromised the appellate system
''by such
roportionately high rates of denial of oral
atmosphere of the late twentieth century has passed, perhaps a
increased discretion not to hear cases they do not believe warrant oral argument."); see also
Kravitz, supra n. 16, at 255 (quoting Chairman's Report, supra this note).
I 07. Carrington, supra n. 16, at 17- 18 (expressing regret over the trend of fewer and
briefer oral arguments and suggesting a process of invited waiver); Baker, supra n. 4, at
116 (finding the federal courts' presumption against oral argument contrary to the written
presumption underlying Rule 34 to be "rather Orwellian"); Martineau, supra n. l 0, at 3032 (describing a revised oral argument fonn that is less fonnal and more interactive).
108. See Baker, supra n. 15, at 113-14 (describing the federal courts' trade-off of
appellate justice for greater efficiency).
109. Joe S. Cecil & Donna Stienstra, Deciding Cases without Argument: A Description
of Procedures in the Courts of Appeals (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1985) (discussing screening
procedures in federal courts of appeals, many instituted in connection with the increasing
·
number of appeals filed in the 1980s).
llO. Oakley, supra n. 5, at 865. Professor Oakley identifies four such values under the
following rubrics: error correction; institutional impact; a sense of participation; and
·
legitimation of judicial decisions.
Ill. Kravitz, supra n. 16, at 263.
112. Baker, supra n. 4, at 114.
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careful re-evaluation of the costs and benefits of oral argument
will lead to some revival of oral advocacy.
Oral argument serves an important institutional and public
function that is not provided by written submissions. Oral
argument provides public visibility and institutional legitimacy,
which is critically important:
Positive public perception of the judiciary's role in
American political life is indispensable to the effectiveness
of the judicial branch. Indeed, this collective perception is
the very source of judicial legitimacy, the sine qua non of
our common law system. The concept of judicial
legitimacy resides at the center of the constitutional
doctrine of an independent judiciary and is the primary
113
reason why people respect and obey the law.

This visibility and public accountability is more important than
ever. What was once perceived as the '~weakest'' branch is now
perceived as increasingly powerful, and by some, as too
114
Calls for greater judicial accountability and
powerful.
transparency are likewise on the rise. Scholars continue to
express concern about the bureaucratization and efficiency115
driven reforms of the federal ·courts. If the public trust is to be

113. Gregory C. Pingree; Where Lies the Emperor's Robe? An Inquiry· into the Problem
ofJudicial Legitimacy, 86 Or. L. Rev.l095, 1102 (2007) (collecting authorities).
114. Compare The Federalist No. LXXVIII at 99 (Alexander Hamilton) in The
Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States vol. 2 (Central L.J. Co.
1914) (characterizing the judiciary as the branch of government "least dangerous to the
political rights of the Constitution,., be-cause it "'has no influence over either· the sword or
the purse," and asserting that "the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the thr.e e
departtnents of power") (footnote omitted) with Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael
Hennessy, Public Understanding of and St_tpport for the Courts: Survey Results, 95 Geo~
L.J. 899, 901 (2007) (citing data from two national surveys indicating that twenty-eight
percent of Americans polled believed that the Supreme Court "has too much power''); see
also e.g. Jonah Goldberg, Senate "Show Trial" is Product of a Too..-Powerful Court, USA
Today llA (Jan. 11, 2006) (taking position that Senate's rigorous examination of nominees
for Supreme Court is justified by significant power invested in Justices, here likened to
"unelected monarchs"); Lance Eric Neff, Keys to the Kingdom~· Interpretive Power and
Societal Influence During Two Ages, 7 Fla. Coastal L. Rev. 697, 700-02 & 701 n. 19
(2006) (noting that the judiciary is commonly perceived as too powerful and relatively
unaccountable).
115. See generally Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks
and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (2007); see also Marin K.
LeVy, The Mechanics ofFederal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Managementin the Circuit
Courts, 61 Duke L.J. 315 (2011); Penelope Pether, Inequitablelnjunctions: The Scandal of

Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1435 (2004)~
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maintained, courts in the modern era must use transparent and
reassuring procedures. Public visibility and accountability are
especially important for the federal courts of appeals, the venue
for the one and only appeal as of right in civil and criminal
116
Procedural shortcuts such as "dispositions on motion,
cases.
an enlarged central staff, disposition without opinion, and
unpublished opinions" make disposition without oral argument
117
The federal courts better serve their
especially weighty.
function by not only doing justice but showing justice being
done. It is a principle "deeply rooted in the common law, that
118
'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice. "'
Institutional legitimacy is negatively "affected by
procedural shortcuts such as the elimination of oral
119
Oral argument provides numerous benefits for
argument."
litigants and their counsel. First, there is a value for the parties in
facing the decisionmaker. The opportunity to physically see and
interact with the federal government officials decidin9 one's
20
case increases confidence in the system and the outcome. Oral
argument provides a sense of participation in a mutual, if
adversarial, endeavor that is fundamental to the common law
121
system.
It also '.'gives to litigants the assurance that judges
122
an assurance that is
themselves are making the decisions,"
increasingly important in a staff-driven, bureaucratic, decisionfactory system.
116. In 2010 and 20 11 , of the 282,895 cases filed in federal district courts, 55,992
appeals were taken to the courts of appeals (twenty percent), and only 170-eighty-six for
full argument and eighty-four for decision without argument were taken by the Supreme
Court (.06 percent) during the 2010 Tenn. See 2011 AO Report, supra n. 2, at 58, 59, 119
(tbl. A-1: "Supreme Court of the United States-Cases on Docket, Disposed of, and
Remaining on Docket at Conclusion of October Tenns, 2006 Through 2010"; tbl. B: "U.S.
Courts of Appeals Appeals Commenced, Tenninated, and Pending During the 12-Month
Periods Ending September 30, 2010 and 2011"; tbl. C: "U.S. District Courts Civil Cases
Commenced, Tenninated, and Pending During the 12-Month Periods Ending September
30, 2010 and 2011 ").
117. Martineau, supra n. 10, at 13.
118. Levine v. U.S., 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960) (quoting Offutt v. U.S., 348 U.S. 11, 14
( 1954)).
119. Jerry Goldman, Appellate Justice Economized: Screening and Its Effect on
Outcomes and Legitimacy in Restructuring Justice: The Innovations of the Ninth Circuit
and the Future of the Federal Courts 140 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., Cornell U. Press 1990).
120. Carrington, supra n. 16, at 17-18.
121. /d.
122. /d. at 17; see generally Pether, Sorcerers, supra n. 115.
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Second, oral argument provides an interactive opportunity
for parties to focus the panel's collective attention on the case's
most important points, to respond to the court's. issues of
greatest concern, and to address issue that arise out of the
consideration of the case that were not apparent during the
123
briefing.
Unlike written submissions, which, as Socrates
bemoaned, cannot address the varied questions and values of the
reader, oral argument allows a party a fuller, more meaningful
124
interaction. Third, the most direct benefit is the opportunity to
125
influence the outcome.
Judges have certainly given the
126
indication that oral argument does affect their decisions.
When asked about the importance of oral argument Justice
Jackson stated that "the justices would answer unanimously that
now, as traditionally, they rely heavily on oral presentations,"
and adde-d that "it .a lwa ·s is of the highest,- and often of

come to a different conclusion with oral argument than they
would have without it, oral argument has a significant ability to
128
affect the outcome of cases and the course of precedent.
Additionally, oral argument

rovides an opportunity to

the outcome itself is unchanged, broadening or narrowing the
130
breadth of the court's opinion may result from oral argument.
For a case sent back for retrial or rehearing, the details of the

123. Martineau, supra n. 10, at 17-18.
124. Plato, supra n. 19, at 191 (noting that written words "do not know to whom they
should or should not speak; and if they are mistreated or unjustly slandered, they always
require the creator of their being to rescue them").
125. Martineau, supra n. 10, at 17.
126. Myron R. Bright & Richard S. Arnold, Oral Argument? It May Be Crucial! 10
A.B.A. J. 68, 70 (Sept. 1984) (reporting that in a ten-month study, Judge Bright found oral
argument changed his mind in thirty-one percent of cases and Judge Arnold found that oral
argument changed his mind in seventeen percent); Jolm M. Harlan, What Part Does the
Oral Argument Play in the Conduct of an Appeal? 41 Cornell L.Q. 6, 6 (1955) (asserting
that "the lawyer who depreciates the oral argument as an effective-instrument of appellate
advocacy, and stakes all on his brief~ is making a great mistake'').
.
.
127. A Good Quarrel:~ supra n. 57, at 4-5.
128. Rex E. Lee, Oral Argument in the Supreme Court; 12 A.B.A. J.. 60, 60 (Supp. June
15, 1986) (noting that "there are cases in which the oral argument can change some votes,
and you cannot assum-e that your case will not be one of them").

129. /d.
130. ld.
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court's opinion may have a significant effect on the later
proceedings.
Judges also benefit from oral argument. They benefit from
greater institutional legitimacy and the accountability that comes
with visible judicial involvement. But holding oral argument
also provides other advantages. First, the interactivity benefits
131
judges in their understanding of the cases before them.
It
allows judges to probe issues omitted from the briefs, whether
132
those omissions are intentional or inadvertent. Oral argument
133
can serve an important role in clarifying the matter at hand
Litigants often speak past each other in their briefs, owing to
their different perspectives on the case, and oral argument
allows judges to focus the opposing positions. Another
ambiguity or omission that may occur in appellate briefs is the
effect of a proposed ruling on the body of precedent. This is an
issue that the parties may not have raised for tactical reasons or
simply because they do not view it as sufficiently important. At
oral argument, a court can pose hypotheticals examininf how
13
each party's proposed holding would affect future cases.
Finally, there are professional benefits to conducting oral
arguments. A robust oral argument practice can help to avoid
judicial isolation, increase each judge's interactions with the
fellow judges, including visiting judges and those sitting by
designation. Oral argument can impress upon judges the
humanity, gravity, and importance of their work, which may in
turn improve both the quality of judicial decisions and judicial
job satisfaction.
Arrayed against these important values, the diminution in
the frequency and length of oral argument is a dubious trade for
efficiency in case disposition. Because of its importance to
131. Stanley Mosk, In Defense of' Oral Argument, 1 J. App. Prac. & Process 25, 27
( 1999).
132. /d.; see also Rehnquist, supra n. 1, at 1021 (noting that lawyers can at oral
argwnent "play a significant role in responding to the concerns of the judges, concerns that
counsel won't always be able to anticipate in preparing the briefs").
133. Bright & Arnold, supra n. 126, at 68-69.
134. See Myron H. Bright, The Changing Nature of the Federal Appeals Process in the
1970s: A Challenge to the Bar, 65 F.R.D. 496, 506 (1975) (noting that oral aigument
"allows the judges to ask questions to clear up any doubts that court might have about the
case or the lawyer's approach to it"); Irving R. Kaufman, Appellate Advocacy in the
Federal Courts, 19 F.R.D. 165, 171-72 (1979) (discussing importance of answers to
questions posed by judges at oral argument).
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appellate justice, oral argument should be more common and of
greater length, and should offer sufficient opportunity for
litigants to clarify, persuade, and have their day in court.
V. DIMINISHED ORAL ARGUMENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

In the Golden Age of oral argument, it was available for the
asking and reportedly time was generously allocated at up to one
135
hour per side. Be.ginning in the 1980s, oral argument began to
decline in frequency, and its length was shortened for most cases
in the federal courts to twenty minutes per side. By 2011, the
incidence of oral argument in the Eleventh Circuit had declined
136
to a mere sixteen percent of cases, a third of what it had been
137
in the Fifth Circuit during the early 1980s,
and the
presumptive time allotted was reduced to fifteen minutes per
138
side.
This decline is not unusual or atypical; there has been a
roughly comparable nationwide decline in the frequency and
length ?f oral argument throughout the federal courts of
140

1 1

argued,
down from nearly two-thtrds tn the early 1980s,
and the time allotted in most circuits was limited to "about
142
fifteen minutes."
The different methods appellate courts

135. Carrington, supra n. 16, at 16-17.
136. 2011 AO Report, supra n. 2.
137. 1980 AO Report, supra n. 3, at tbl. S-1. The Eleventh Circuit was split off from the_
Fifth Circuit in 1980. See generally Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (1980).
138. Telephone Interview
by
Daniel Drazen, Research Asst. to Profs. Cleveland &
•
Wisotsky, with Tresa Patterson, Deputy Clerk, Off. of the Clerk, U.S. Ct. ofApp. for the
11th Cir. (July 3, 2012).
139. Levy, supra n. 115, at 320-25 (finding_a decline in oral arguments relative to the
caseload as a whole to be a direct effect of the pressure on the judicial economy). This
decline may also be a delayed result of the Supreme_Court's ruling in FCC v. WJR, the
Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 275-76 (1949) ("[D]ue process of law has never been
a tern1 of fixed and invariable content. This is as true with reference to oral argument as
with respect to other elements of procedural due process. For this Court has held in some
situations that such argument is essential to a fair hearing, in others that argument
submitted in writing is sufficient.").
140.. 2011 AO Report, supra n. 2.
141. 1980AO Report, supra n. 3, attbl. S-1.
142. Administrative· Office of the U.S. Courts, How the Federal Courts Work, The
Appeals Process, http://www. uscourts. gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/
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~plement

in reviewing thei~ casel~ads may have a si~ificant
1 3
1mpact on whether a case wtll recetve oral argument.
In the
Eleventh Circuit, the percentage of oral argument cases in 2011
144
was strikingly low at 15.8 percent, while in the D.C. Circuit,
145
43.4 percent of cases received oral argument.
In interpreting the data, the difference between civil and
criminal cases must be noted. In 1989, criminal appeals
nationwide were argued 55.3 percent of the time, while civil
146
appeals were argued 46.1 percent of the time. ' In the 1997-98
court year, the percenta9es were approx~ately_ e9-ual at just
14
over forty percent each. By 2011, the ratto of cnmtnal appeals
receiving oral argument had fallen to _23.1 percent, while civil
148
For whatever reason or
appeals held higher at 36.4 percent~
reasons, the screening process filters out more criminal appeals
and favors civil appeals for oral argument.
Is there a hole in the data? The analysis set forth here
isolates_ the percentage of cases, civil and criminal, as the
measurable variable. The implicit assumption is that the
percentages reflect the screening processes and not some other
variable. We cannot rule out the possibility that some other
factor may be at work, perhaps, for example, a decline in the
percentage of appellate attorneys requesting that oral argument
be set. This is not an impossible explanation, but one that is
extremely unlikely. There is a compelling litigation preS1.1mption
that a party who has lost in the trial court and seeks reversal on
appeal should as a matter of course request oral argument. It is a

HowCourtsWorkffheAppealsProcess.aspx (accessed Sept. 21, 2012; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) [hereinafter The Appeals Process].
143. Levy, supra n. 115, at J 17.
144. 2011 AO Report; supra n. 2
145. /d.
146. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1989 Annual Report of the Director:
Judicial Business of the United States Courts, at tbl. B-1 A.
147. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1998 Annual Report of the Director:
Judicial Business of the United States Courts 95 (tbl. Bl-A: "U.S. Courts of Appeals:~
·
Appeals Commenced, Tetminated, and Pending; by Nature of Suit or Offense, in Appeals
Arising From the U.S. District Courts During the Twelve-Month Period Ended September
30, 1998").
148. 2011 AO Report, supra n. 2, at 65 (tbl. B-IA: "U.S. Courts of Appeals Appeals
Commenced, Terminated, and Pending, by Nature of Suit or Offense, in Appeals Arising
from the U.S. District Courts During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2011 ").
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protocol
of good
appellate
practice.
Malpractice
considerations also militate in favor of such requests, lest an
attorney who waives oral argument be deemed negligent. And
attorneys who bill by the hour as private counsel or under the
CJA ha\'e a financial incentive to do what is in their clients' best
interests anyway. Although it cannot be proved on the records
kept by the clerks of court, which do not systematically report
on such requests, a dramatic fall-off in the percentage of
appellate counsel requesting oral argument is not a reasonable or
sensible inference. Conunon sense strongly suggests that the
operative variable is the courts' screening out an increasing
proportion of cases for oral argument because they think it is not
particularly valuable_

VI. A PROPOSAL FOR THE RETURN TO A GREATER ROLE
FOR ORAL ADVOCACY

A. Better Screening
Better and more timely input from the attorneys could go a
long way toward restoring a higher proportion of oral argument
cases. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(l) states: "Any
party may file, or a court may require by local rule, a statement
explaining why oral argument should, or need not, be
150
permitted." The Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all require
a statement re arding oral argument be included in both parties'
statement form, from both parties, within fourteen days of the
152
The First, Third, Fourth,
filing of the appellee's last brief.
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have rules statin9 that a party "may"
53
include a statement regarding oral argument. Such a statement
149. See e.g. Carole C. Berry, Effective Appellate Advocacy: Brief Writing and Oral
Argument 125 (2d ed., West 2003) ("never ever waive oral argument") (emphasis in
original).
150. Fed. R. App. P. 34 (a)(l).
151. 5th Cir. R. 28.2.3; lOth Cir. R. 28.2 (C)(4); 11th Cir. R. 28-l(c).
152. 2d Cir. R. 34.l(a) (providing in addition that "[f]ailure to timely file the Oral
Argument Statement Fonn signifies that the party does not seek oral argument").
153. 1st Cir. R. 34.0(a); 3d Cir. R. 34(b) (providing that "Any party ... has the right to
file a statement with the court setting forth the reasons why . . . oral argument should be
heard"); 4th Cir. R. 34(a); 6th Cir. R. 34(a} (providing that "[a] party desiring oral argument

)
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should be required in all courts in all cases, as it surely provides
information relevant to the decision whether to grant oral
argument and to allocate an appropriate amount of time for it if
granted. Presently, the statements submitted by counsel are often
boilerplate of the aid--the-decisional-process~of-the-court type.
Attorneys should be required to actually argue the need for oral
·argument, briefly, by giving an overview of the case: How many
issues? How complex? Is there a novel question, one of first
impression, or an ambiguity as to the applicable rule because of
panel inconsistency? To what extent are the parties agreed on
the facts and the applicable rules? Is it a summary judgment
appe.al or a full-record appeal from a jury verdict?
Arguably, staff attorneys engage in some ofthese inquiries,
154
but theirs is not the perspective of an advocate. Staff attorneys
in the D.C. Circuit, for example, may also rate a case they have
recommende-d for oral argument as either complex, regular, or
155
regular/plus based on its level of complexity~ But this method
further exemplifies a flaw in the process because their
knowledge of the case is not comparable to that of appellate
counsel; staff attorneys have not lived with the case and have
not read the record. And the forms that get filed by counsel early
must include a statement in the brief explaining why the court should hear oral argument");
7th Cir R. 34 (f).
154. D.C. Cir. R. 340) (stating that staff attorneys screen new appeals to detennine what
treatment is appropriate); 1st Cir. I.O.P. VI(A) (stating "(i]nitially, the staff attorney
reviews the briefs" and consults with a panel of three judges to decide if the case warrants
oral argument); 3d Cir. I.O.P. 2.1 (stating that a panel "detennines whether there will be
oral argument and the amount of time allocated"); 4th Cir. R. 34(a) (stating "[i]f all of the
judges of the panel to which a pending appeal has been referred conclude that oral
argument is not to be allowed, they may make any appropriate decision without :oral
argument including, but not limited to, affinnance or reversal"); 5th Cir. I.O.P. (A)
(pertaining to 5th Cir. R. 34 and stating that judges screen cases with assistance from the
staff attorney); 6th Cir. I.O.P. 34(a)(4) (stating that "[p]anels detennine which of the cases
assigned to them will receive oral argument and which do not require oral argwnent"); 6th
Cir. l.O. P. 202(c )(3) (stating that the staff attomey;s office "provides legal support to the
court as a whole, rather than to individual judges by making dispositional
re_commendations in those cases that the court has decided do not require oral argument
under Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)"); 8th Cir. R. 34A (a) (stating that the chief judge appoints
either a clerk, senior staff attorney, or panel of judges to· screen cases); lOth Cir.
Practitioner's Guide VIII(B) (stating that H[i]n screening, the judges review each case to
determine whether it should be directed to the oral argument calendar, assigned to a
separate calendar without oral argument, or whether the screening panel should dispose of
the matter"); 11th Cir~ R. 34-3(e) (stating that panels of three judges screen appeals to
detemtine if they warrant oral argument).
155. Levy~ supra. n. 115, at 335.
.

.
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on as docketing statements or appeal infortnation statements are
quite limited and in some cases superficial. They are also timed
too early to be really informative. The optimum timing for the
statements of counsel regarding oral argument is the date when
the reply brief is filed or could have been filed. At that point, the
issues between the parties are joined, the conflicting positions
are clear, and the nuances known.
An example of a form with some depth is that used by the
156
Second Circuit as its Civil Pre-Argument Statement (Form C).
It requires an addendum including a brief description of the
nature of the action; the result below; a copy of the notice of
appeal and the lower court docket sheet; and copies of all
relevant opinions and orders forming the basis for the appeal. A
second required addendum must list "the issues proposed to be
raised on appeal, as well as the ap~licable appellate standard of
57
review for each proposed issue."
The problem is that the
required disclosures come too soon, only fourteen days from
filing the notice of appeal. Appellate counsel coming into the
case anew would have little of substance to say before reading
the trial transcript, which, absent daily copy, would not
generally be available to him or her in time to be read and
analyzed. Even where the appellate lawyer was also trial
counsel, he or she will rarely be able to specify all issues to be
raised. The only safe answer to the fonn at the fourteen-day
mark is something general like "Appellant proposes to raise all
issues supported by the record on appeal after he has received
and read it."
B. One Size Does Not Fit All.

Cases assigned to the oral argument track are typically
slotted in at standard length, for that circuit, most commonly
158
fifteen minutes. It appears from our survey of the local rules
and lOPs that most courts do not give systematic attention to or
156. See United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Clerk's Office, Civil
Appeal Pre-Argu1nent Statement (Form C), http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/clerk/Fonns_and_
instructions/pdf/Fonn%20C%20revised%203-ll.pdf.
157. /d.
158. The Appeals Process, supra n. 142.
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differential weight in calendaring a case for oral argument to a
multi-party appeal. Probably, this is due to the fact that many
multi-party appeals involve the same issue for more than one
party, so there is no distinct analysis required by the "extra"
party's presence in the appeal.
But this is often not true. Criminal appeals in particular
have the potential to present co-appellants who were all
defendants below arguing very different points on appeal. Take,
for example, a conspiracy case in which the "kingpin" defendant
is convicted upon the testimony of cooperating witnesses with
direct knowledge of his crimes; his issues on appeal are not
insufficiency of the evidence but may arise from improper
restrictions on cross examination, or improper admission of
prior crimes evidence under Rule 404(b), or other procedural
issues. By contrast, a secondary co-conspirator may have
grounds to argue that the evidence of his or her role in the
conspiracy was so slight that Rule 29 judgment of acquittal
should have been granted. A third defendant may or may not
have appellate issues to challenge the conviction but may argue
that the sentence imposed under the advisory guidelines was
unreasonable in length or involved an incorrect application of a
particular guideline.
In this scenario (drawn from our own real-life experience),
you have three defendants with three distinct legal issues on
appeal who have very little overlap in their cases except as coconspirators under the indictment. And the tirne allowed for this
oral argument was fifteen minutes to be divided among the three
appellants. Recall that the case was deemed substantial enough
to warrant oral argument in the first place. But the allocation of
fifteen minutes dilutes or undermines that initial judgment Of
course, under the rules, a motion to extend or enlarge the oral
159
argument was permitted,
and was made. It was denied. The
result? The first party argued for seven minutes, the second
argued for four minutes, the third argued for two, and the
remaining two minutes were reserved for rebuttaL This is hardly
consistent with the grand tradition of oral advocacy that
prevailed in the federal courts not so long ago.

159. See lith Cir. LO.P. to 11th Cir. R. 34-4, at 11.

(
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VII. CONCLUSION

•

Oral argument is, as Chief Justice Rehnquist has described
it, ''a three dimensional experience," in which the litigants,
counsel, and the court engage in a public, interactive, collegial,
adversarial, serious, and immediate experience that cannot be
160
duplicated by exclusive reliance . on written briefs.
It is an
unparalleled opportunity for litigants, through counsel, to face
those who will decide their fate, for lawyers to make certain that
their arguments are understood, and for judges to understand the
facts, legal arguments, and human dimensions of the case to be
decided. Appellate oral argument, at its best, is vital to a threedimensional decisionmaking process. We do not endeavor to
argue that speech has primacy over writing in communicative or
persuasive value, nor that courts in the United States should
revert to an exclusively oral legal practice. We believe, however,
that there is significantly greater value in oral argument than
presently recognized by federal appellate court rules and
practice. We recommend that this value be more fully
appreciated and that the federal appellate courts make greater
use of oral argument.

160. Rehnquist, supra n. I, at 1022.
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APPENDIX

Table 1
Time Allotted Each Side for Oral Ar ~ument*
Circuit

Time Allotment
•

First Circuit

Nonnally no more than 15 minutes

Second Circuit

Generally 10 minutes or less

Third Circuit

UsJ.Ially 15 minutes

Fourth Circuit

Normally 20 minutes

Fifth Circuit

Most cases are allowed 20 minutes

Sixth Circuit

15 minutes
•

Seventh Circuit

Many cases get 10 to 20 minutes

Eighth Circuit

Usually 10, 15, or 20 minutes

Ninth Circuit

Generally 10 to 20 minutes

Tenth Circuit

15 minutes

Eleventh Circuit

Typically 15 minutes

D.C. Circuit

15 minutes is most common
.

Federal Circuit

Ordinarily 15 minutes

*See 1st Cir. R. 34 (c)( I); United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Clerk's
Office, Oral Argument, http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/clerk Fonns_and_instructions/How_
to_ appeaVCivil_case/Oral_argument.htm (accessed Oct. 16, 2012; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process); 3d Cir. lOP 2.1; 4th Cir. R. 34(d); 5th Cir R.
34.11; 6th Cir R. 34(f)(l); 7th Cir. Practitioner's Guide, XXVII(B); 8th Cir. R. 34A(b); 9th
Cir. Court Structure and Procedures, E(7); lOth Cir. Practitioner's Guide, VIII(C)(l);
Telephone Interview by Daniel Drazen, Research Asst. to Prof. Wisotsky, with Tresa
Patterson, Deputy Clerk, Off. of the Clerk, U.S. Ct. of App. for the 11th Cir. (July 3, 2012);
D.C. Cir. lOP XI(C)(l).

150

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

Table 2
Percentage of Appeals Terminated on the Merits, by Category
~All Circuits'*

•

.

Year

Criminal
roral Ar2ument

Criminal
Submitted on Briefs

Civil
O.ral Araument

Civil
Submitted on Briefs

1989

55.3

44.7

46.1

53.9·

1990

53.3

46.7

41.9

58.1

1991

50.8

49.2

41.8

58.2

1992

50.1

49.9

41.8

58.2

1993

47.0

53.0

36.6

63.4

1994

48.4

51.6

37.4

62.6

1995

48.2

51.8

36.6

63.4

1996

44.8

55.2

36.2

63.8

1997

40.4.

59.6

40.6

1998

41.2

58.8

41.9

58.1

1999

39.5

60.5

40.6

59.4

2000

36.2

63.8

40.4

59.6

2001

33.7

66.3

39.5

60.5

2002

30.2

69.8

40.1

59.9

2003

30.1

69.9

39.6

60.4

2004

31.0

69.,0

41.6

58.4

2005

28.3

71.7

41.8

58.2

2006

25.3

74.7

40.3

59.7

2007

26.3

73.7

39.7

60.3

2008

29.4

70.6

41.3

58.7

2009

24.3

75.7
'

41.2

58.8

2010

24.6

75.4

37.9

62.1

2011

23.1

76.9

36.4

63.6

.

59.4

•

*See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1989-2011 Annual Reports of the
Director: Judicial Business ofthe United States Courts (tbl. B-lA).
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Table 3
Average Percentage of Appeals Terminated on the Merits
after Oral Argument or Submission on Briefs
(All Circuits)*

.

Year

Oral Argument

Submission on
Briefs

1971

65.8

34.2

1972

52.6

47.4

1973

59.4

40.6

1974

61.2

38.8

1975

61.5

38.5

1976

60.5

39.5

1977

54.8

45.2

1978

59.2

40.8

1979

61.3

38.7

1980

62.9

37.1

1981

69.2

30.8

1982

66.9

33.1

1983

63.9

36.1

1984

60.8

39.2

1985

56.3

43.7

1986

53.8

46.2

1987

50.7

49.3

1988

51.2

48.8

1989

48.4

51.6

1990

45.1

54.9

1991

44.4

55.6

1992

43.9

56.1

1993

39.7

60.3

1994

40.6

59.4

1995

39.9

60.1

*See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1971-2011 Annual Reports of the
Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts (tbl. S-1 ).

152

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

.

Table 3 (continued)
Average Percentage of Appeals Terminated on the Merits
after Oral Argument or Submission on Briefs
(All Circuits)
Year

Oral Ar

~ument

Submission on Briefs

1996

38.7

61.3

1997

40.1

59.9

1998

41.0

59.0

1:999

37.1

62.9

2000

35.4

2001

32.3

67.7

2002

32.9

67.1

2003

32.5

67.5

2004

31.5

68.5

2005

30.1

69.9

2006

25., 9

74J

2007

27.3

72.7

2008

30.3

69.7

2009

28.5

71.5

2010

26.4

73.6

2011

25.'1

74.9

.

64.6

